The Sky is Not Falling, Todd Newman: The Ninth Circuit Endorses a Measured Reading of \u3cem\u3eNewman\u27s\u3c/em\u3e Definition of Personal Benefit for Insider Trading Liability in \u3cem\u3eUnited States v. Salman\u3c/em\u3e by Potapchuk, John L.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 6 Electronic Supplement Article 9
4-29-2016
The Sky is Not Falling, Todd Newman: The Ninth
Circuit Endorses a Measured Reading of Newman's
Definition of Personal Benefit for Insider Trading
Liability in United States v. Salman
John L. Potapchuk
Boston College Law School, john.potapchuk@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John L. Potapchuk, The Sky is Not Falling , Todd Newman: The Ninth Circuit Endorses a Measured Reading of Newman's Definition of





THE SKY IS NOT FALLING, TODD 
NEWMAN: THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
ENDORSES A MEASURED READING OF 
NEWMAN’S DEFINITION OF PERSONAL 
BENEFIT FOR INSIDER TRADING 
LIABILITY IN UNITED STATES v. SALMAN 
Abstract: On July 6, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in 
United States v. Salman, declined to adopt the novel definition of the person-
al-benefit element for insider trading, as articulated by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman in December 2014. In 
so doing, the court’s decision presented the first significant resistance to the 
longevity of the Newman court’s apparent holding that the personal-benefit el-
ement requires proof of a pecuniary exchange in all instances. This Comment 
argues that the court in Salman correctly declined to extend the Newman per-
sonal-benefit definition beyond its facts, that the two cases are reconcilable, and 
together illustrate the difference between “friends” and family for the purposes 
of establishing tipper-tippee, insider-trading liability. 
INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading is a type of securities fraud that inhabits a somewhat 
murky area of U.S. securities law.1 Neither Congress nor the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) have been able to settle on one clear definition 
of insider trading.2 With vague statutory guidance provided by section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the 1934 Act”), and SEC Rule 10b-
5 promulgated thereunder (“Rule 10b-5”), the contours of insider-trading law 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Many have 
opined on the difficulty created by Congress’s reluctance to adopt a clear statutory definition of ille-
gal insider trading, contending that the “judge-made law” on which the courts must rely can create 
potential coverage gaps, or, conversely, can reach actions believed to be lawful by those who commit 
them. See id.; Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, The Evolving Mystery of Illegal Insider Trad-
ing, N.Y.L.J. (ONLINE), Aug. 3, 2010, http://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/00225/_res/
id=Attachments/index=0/070081001Morvillo.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRB3-FR73]. 
 2 E.g., John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014 
UTAH L. REV. 1, 3. Despite the current absence of clear statutory guidance, proposed legislation 
aimed at alleviating that lack of clarity is currently pending in both the U.S. Senate and U.S. 
House of Representatives. See Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015); Ban 
Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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have been predominantly defined by the courts.3 Although it may come in 
various forms, “insider trading” generally encompasses the buying or selling 
of a security on the basis of material nonpublic information, in breach of a 
duty to disclose that information or abstain from trading.4 With regards to a 
specific subspecies of insider trading—tipper-tippee liability—the test for 
determining whether there has been a breach of duty, and a triggering of lia-
bility, is whether the insider will “personally benefit” from the disclosure, 
either directly or indirectly.5 Courts have long held that a personal benefit 
may be inferred when “an insider makes a gift of confidential information to 
a trading relative or friend.”6 Many have argued that the 2014 holding by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman 
marked a meaningful departure from the established scope of the personal-
                                                                                                                           
 3 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 367 n.1 (noting that Congress 
and the SEC have long been opposed to comprehensive insider-trading legislation for fear that any 
clear definition would inevitably create exploitable “loopholes;” however, the alternative judge-
made law that has developed has created many gaps); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015); David T. 
Cohen, Note, Old Rule, New Theory: Revising the Personal Benefit Requirement for Tipper/
Tippee Liability Under the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV. 547, 552 
(2006) (noting that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) and SEC 
Rule 10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”) comprise the primary basis for the federal prohibition of insider trad-
ing). See generally United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (extending liability to 
“outsiders,” who owe no duty to disclose to the shareholders, but rather owe a duty to the source 
of the information); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) (extending liability to situations in 
which the insider does not trade on the basis of material nonpublic information, but discloses or 
“tips” the information to “tippees” who then trade on the basis of the confidential information 
before it is publicly disclosed); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228–30 (1980) (announc-
ing insider trading liability where a corporate insider had a duty to disclose arising from a relation-
ship of trust and confidence between himself and the shareholders of the corporation). Section 
10(b) of the 1934 Act has been codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 has been codified 
in the regulations as 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 4 See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445–47 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
242 (2015) (mem.); Insider Trading, U.S. SEC, http:// www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm [https://
perma.cc/F7HK-VUPF]. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that “a state-
ment is material [for the purposes of securities law] if there is a substantial likelihood that a rea-
sonable investor would consider it important in making a decision.” United States v. Tarallo, 380 
F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2004). An insider generally owes a duty to the shareholders of the insid-
er’s corporation to not exploit his or her positioning within the company’s structure for personal 
gain. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226–30. 
 5 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662; Max Stendahl, Brother’s Keeper, LAW360 (Mar. 4, 2016), 
http:// www.law360.com/articles/767599/brother-s-keeper-a-landmark-insider-trading-case-and-the-
unraveling-of-a-family. Tipper-tippee liability occurs in the context of a selective disclosure of confi-
dential information by an insider to an outsider, the tippee, who then trades on the information. 2 
BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK § 17:24 (West 2015). The idea 
behind the personal-benefit litmus test is that if the insider personally benefits from a disclosure, he 
or she is violating the duty owed to the shareholders to not exploit his or her position for personal 
gain. See Stendahl, supra. 
 6 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664; United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
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benefit element by narrowing the test to require proof of a pecuniary ex-
change.7 
In July 2015, in United States v. Salman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt the Second Circuit’s so-called novel defi-
nition of personal benefit.8 Salman involved an appeal from a remote tippee, 
Bassam Salman, convicted for trading on confidential information that he had 
obtained indirectly from his insider brother-in-law.9 Salman urged the court 
to adopt the holding in Newman, which he argued had significantly changed 
the law on the personal-benefit element, by implementing a new, constricted 
definition.10 The Ninth Circuit declined to adopt such a reading of Newman, 
and rejected the assertion that it could be followed so broadly.11 In distin-
guishing Salman from the facts in Newman, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the clear, fraternal relationship between the insider and his initial tippee, 
along with the insider’s intent to help his brother by giving him confidential 
information, was all enough to infer that the insider received a personal bene-
fit for his tips.12 The relationship between the holdings in Salman and New-
man has drawn significant attention to the uncertainty regarding the appropri-
ate scope of the personal-benefit element.13 In the fall of 2016, the U.S. Su-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Carlyle H. Dauenhauer, Note, Justice in Equity: Newman and Egalitarian Reconciliation 
for Insider-Trading Theory, 12 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 39, 54–57 (2015); Matt Levine, Justices Will 
Know Insider Trading When They See It, THINKADVISOR.COM (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.think
advisor.com/2016/02/05/justices-will-know-insider-trading-when-they-see-i?t=legal-compliance
%3Fref%3Dchannel-blogs&page_all=1 [https://perma.cc/NQ3V-CK83] [hereinafter Levine, Jus-
tices Will Know]; see also infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (discussing the view that the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s holding sharply narrows the definition of personal 
benefit by requiring a quid pro quo exchange in addition to proof of a friendship or familial relation-
ship). The Second Circuit in 2014 in United States v. Newman declined to permit an inference of 
personal benefit on the basis of the “mere fact of friendship” alone in the absence of a “meaningfully 
close personal relationship” that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential and “repre-
sents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” See 773 F.3d at 452. 
 8 See United States v. Salman (Salman II), 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 
(Salman III) 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016) (mem.). 
 9 See id. at 1088–89. A “remote tippee” is a person that receives confidential information 
indirectly, and the term generally refers to a person who is at least one degree removed from the 
original insider’s tip. Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 
183 & n.18 (2006). 
 10 See Appellant’s Reply Brief Concerning United States v. Newman, at 1–4, Salman II, 792 
F.3d 1087 (May 4, 2015) [hereinafter Appellant’s Reply Brief] (No. 14-10204), 2015 WL 
2165460, at *1–4. 
 11 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1093–94. 
 12 See id. 
 13 William R. Baker III et al., The Circuits Are Split: Are Tangible Benefits Required for In-
sider Trading Liability?, LEXOLOGY (July 10, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx
?g=f2b3ad55-1e63-4d82-81f8-1945c3c6d2ab [https://perma.cc/598A-LKL6]; Levine, Justices 
Will Know, supra note 7; Matt Levine, When Can Investors Talk to Companies?, BLOOM-
BERGVIEW (July 31, 2015 3:47 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-07-31/when-
can-investors-talk-to-companies- [hereinafter Levine, When Can Investors Talk] [https://perma.
cc/CD4C-B36P]. 
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preme Court will review the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Salman on the issue of 
personal benefit.14 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s holding was correct and 
that the two opinions should be reconciled by a Supreme Court affirmation of 
the Salman holding that recognizes the substantive difference between friend-
ships and family relationships.15 Part I of this Comment reviews the current 
state of insider-trading jurisprudence, discusses the facts behind Newman and 
the Second Circuit’s holding, and provides the facts and procedural posture of 
Salman.16 Part II explores the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Salman and further 
discusses the relationship between the Salman and Newman opinions.17 Part 
III argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly declined to extend the Newman per-
sonal-benefit definition beyond its facts, and that the Ninth Circuit’s meas-
ured reading of Newman illustrates that Second Circuit’s holding was not a 
meaningful departure from existing doctrine, but rather an attempted clarifi-
cation.18 Part III further argues that the two cases should be reconciled by the 
Supreme Court in an affirmation of the Salman holding and a clearer articula-
tion of existing doctrine.19 
I. MURKY WATERS: THE STATE OF INSIDER-TRADING LAW 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 serve as the primary basis 
for the federal prohibition of insider trading.20 Although insider trading is not 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Salman III, 136 S. Ct. at 899. The Court will consider the issue of whether the personal- 
benefit element of an insider-trading claim requires proof of an objective exchange or whether proof 
of a close family relationship is enough to support an inference that the insider received a benefit for 
the tip. See id. (limiting grant of certiorari to one question). 
 15 See infra notes 88–108 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 20–62 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 67–83 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 88–102 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 103–108 and accompanying text. 
 20 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2011); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5. Insider trading cases are typically, but not exclusively, brought under section 10(b). 
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Cohen, supra note 3, at 552; Morvillo & Anello, supra note 1. Both crimi-
nal and civil actions can be brought against insider-trading violators under rule 10b-5. See Coles, 
supra note 9, at 186 n.27. Criminal enforcement is handled by the U.S. Department of Justice, and 
civil actions may be brought by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (criminal enforcement); id. § 78u(d) 
(civil enforcement); see Coles, supra note 9, at 186 n.27. Liability under any theory of insider trad-
ing requires proof of scienter, which is defined as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, ma-
nipulate or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 n.12 (1976); Obus, 693 
F.3d at 286. For civil violations of section 10(b), recklessness has largely been accepted as the mini-
mally sufficient culpable mental state to satisfy the scienter requirement. See, e.g., In re K-tel Intern., 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 893 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that the scienter requirement under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may be satisfied by a showing of “severe recklessness”); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 
F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the scienter requirement may be satisfied by pleading “con-
scious recklessness”); Phillips v. LCI Intern., Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). In con-
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expressly proscribed by either section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, its prohibition has 
been crafted out of the statutory scheme.21 Section 10(b) was designed as a 
catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices, and it grants broad authority 
to the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations in furtherance of that objec-
tive.22 Among other things, it prohibits the use of “any manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance” “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security” in violation of SEC rules or regulations.23 Rule 10b-5 implements 
section 10(b) by forbidding the use of “any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”24 The act of 
trading on nonpublic information has generally been considered a “deceptive 
device” under these provisions.25 
A. Insiders, Tips, and Trades, Oh My: Theories of  
Insider Trading Liability 
The U.S. Supreme Court has shaped the scope of insider-trading liability 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by carving out several complementary 
theories of liability from the statutory framework: classical theory, misappro-
priation theory, and tipper-tippee liability.26 Under the classical theory, corpo-
rate insiders are prohibited from trading in the securities of their own corpora-
                                                                                                                           
trast, willfulness is required in order to establish a criminal violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a); see 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665–66. 
 21 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 445 (noting that the federal of prohibition on insider trading is 
based on the notion that it is a type of securities fraud and discussing the framework that has been 
crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court to deal with specific instances of unlawful trading); see also 
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (noting that congressional intent to promote investor 
confidence has influenced the U.S. Supreme Court to direct that section 10(b) be construed with 
flexibility in order to “effectuate its remedial purposes”). Three seminal U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions have shaped the contours of insider trading law: Chiarella v. United States from 1980, Dirks 
v. SEC from 1983, and United States v. O’Hagan from 1997. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; 
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–30. 
 22 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226; VanCook, 653 F.3d at 138; see also 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206 (finding an overall congressional intent to prevent “manipulative and 
deceptive practices” and to create civil liability for business practices conducted “other than in 
good faith”). 
 23 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 24 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see Laura D. Mruk, The Proverbial Axe to the Judicial Oak: The 
Impact of Stoneridge on Plaintiff’s Actions Under § 10(b), 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 281, 284 (2009); 
see also O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651 (“[L]iability under Rule 10b-5 does not extend beyond conduct 
encompassed by section 10(b)’s prohibition.”). 
 25 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 310–11 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
 26 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53 (discussing the misappropriation theory of insider trad-
ing); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (shaping the tipper-tippee subset of insider trading law); Chiarella, 
445 U.S. at 228–30 (shaping the classical theory of insider trading); see also Newman, 773 F.3d at 
445–47 (discussing the history of insider trading liability, specifically addressing classical theory, 
misappropriation theory, and tipper-tippee liability). 
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tions on the basis of material, nonpublic information without first disclosing 
that information.27 Liability under the classical theory is based on a breach of 
this duty to “disclose or abstain” that the insider owes to the shareholders.28 
Courts have held that a breach of this duty constitutes a “deceptive device” 
under section 10(b), as the insider is essentially taking unfair advantage of the 
uninformed shareholders.29 Under misappropriation theory, liability extends 
to “outsiders” who misappropriate and trade on confidential information in 
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information, rather than one owed 
directly to the shareholders.30 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–30; SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 
551, 553–54 (5th Cir. 2010). The term “corporate insiders” traditionally refers to officers, direc-
tors, majority shareholders, and other persons or employees “who have access to confidential 
corporate information.” See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1983). It may also 
refer to “attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a 
corporation.” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; see Cuban, 620 F.3d at 554. The general test to deter-
mine insider status is “whether the person has access to confidential information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.” Feldman v. 
Simkins Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982); see Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. 
 28 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226–30 (citing In re Cady & Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 911 
(1961)). The duty to disclose or abstain arises from a special “relationship of trust and confidence 
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential infor-
mation by reason of their position within that corporation.” Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226–27; see Cu-
ban, 620 F.3d at 553–54. 
 29 See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–29 (noting that such practice is an unfair advantage, 
because the insider is using material information to which minority shareholders do not have access 
for his or her own personal benefit); McGee, 763 F.3d at 300–11; Morvillo & Anello, supra note 1; 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Courts have stressed that simply possessing material, nonpublic infor-
mation is not enough in itself to invoke the duty to disclose, thus the offense is predicated on some 
breach of trust or deception. See United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 321 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235). Therefore, if the insider refrains from trading, then there is no breach. 
See id. 
 30 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; McGee, 763 F.3d at 311; Anderson, supra note 2, at 20–21. 
“Source” refers to the third-party source of the confidential information who has a fiduciary rela-
tionship, or one of similar trust and confidence, to the outsider, and entrusts the information to the 
outsider with the confidence that it will not be exploited. See McGee, 763 F.3d at 311; Anderson, 
supra note 2, at 21–22. For example, misappropriation could occur where a lawyer trades in a 
company’s securities after learning that his or her firm’s client was planning a takeover of that 
company. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48, 659; McGee, 763 F.3d at 311. It is unlikely that the 
government would be able to prosecute the lawyer under the classical theory in this scenario be-
cause the lawyer is not an insider of the company that had its stock traded. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
at 653 n.5; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654–55 (noting that, under classical theory, there can be no 
duty to disclose where the person was not an agent of the corporation, fiduciary, or a person in 
whom the sellers of the securities had placed their trust and confidence). Nevertheless, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized that a fiduciary relationship with a principal insider, such as one 
between a lawyer and his or her firm’s client involved in outside transactions, creates a duty of 
confidentiality and loyalty to the principal. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53. By “secretly con-
verting the principal’s information for personal gain,” such an outsider “defrauds the principal of 
the exclusive use of that information.” See id. The Court has held that such conduct is a “deceptive 
device” under section 10(b). See id. at 653; SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 769 (7th Cir. 2013) (quot-
ing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654). Thus, the duty “runs to the source of the information” rather than 
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Under the tipper-tippee theory, first articulated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Dirks v. SEC in 1983, liability can extend to encompass persons that 
receive “tips” of confidential information from either insiders or misappropri-
ators and then trades on that information.31 Tipper-tippee liability is based on 
the assumption that the person receiving the tip, “the tippee,” assumes a duty 
that is “derivative from that of the insider’s.”32 Liability attaches when (1) the 
insider has breached his duty to the issuer, shareholder, or source of the in-
formation by disclosing it to the tippee, and (2) the tippee knew or had reason 
to know of the insider’s breach of duty.33 In Dirks, the Court announced that 
the test for determining whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider 
“is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his 
disclosure.”34 
The initial step in determining whether the insider has breached his duty 
requires courts to focus on objective criteria that would indicate a direct or 
indirect benefit to the insider, “such as a pecuniary gain or reputational bene-
fit that may translate into future earnings.”35 The Dirks Court identified two 
                                                                                                                           
the trading counterparty, and an outsider entrusted with confidential information must either refrain 
from trading or disclose his or her plans to trade on the information to the principal. See Bauer, 723 
F.3d at 769 (quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n.6); see also O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (discuss-
ing the idea that misappropriation theory protects the integrity of the securities market from abuses 
by those who owe no fiduciary duty to shareholders). 
 31 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659. The underlying charges in Dirks involved the liability of a fi-
nancial analyst who received a confidential tip from a former officer of an insurance company that 
the insurance company had been involved in fraudulent practices. See id. at 648–49. The former 
officer urged the analyst to verify the fraud and disclose it publicly. Id. at 649. During the course 
of his investigation, the analyst openly discussed the information with some of his clients who 
were investors in the company, and some of them later sold their shares based on the analyst’s tip. 
Id. 
 32 Id. at 659. (“Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally 
using undisclosed information to their advantage, but they also may not give such information to an 
outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain.”). In 
formulating this new theory of liability for insider trading, the Court relied on 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b), 
which makes it unlawful to indirectly commit any act made unlawful by the federal securities laws 
“by means of any other person.” See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b)). 
 33 See id. at 660; Evans, 486 F.3d at 321–22. 
 34 463 U.S. at 662. The Court noted the importance of the “purpose of the disclosure,” in its 
analysis as to whether disclosure constitutes a breach, recognizing that in some situations an insid-
er will act consistently with his fiduciary duties yet release of the information may affect the mar-
ket. See id. For example, individuals may mistakenly think that the information has already been 
disclosed or that it is not material enough to affect the market, in which case no breach of trust or 
confidence may be present. See id. The Court quoted the SEC Commissioner’s discussion in Cady 
& Roberts, noting that “the purpose of securities laws was to eliminate ‘use of inside information 
for personal advantage.’” See id. (quoting Cady & Roberts, 40 SEC at 912 n.15). The Court further 
noted that absent some personal gain by the insider, there is no breach of duty to stockholders; thus, if 
there is no breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach by the tippee. Id. 
 35 See id. at 663; Evans, 486 F.3d at 321. 
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specific situations likely to contain “objective facts and circumstances that 
often justify such an inference.”36  
First, a personal benefit may be inferred from “a relationship between 
the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an 
intention to benefit the particular recipient.”37 Second, a personal benefit may 
be inferred “when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative or friend.”38 Courts use these two examples as a litmus test 
when conducting personal-benefit analysis.39 
B. Enter Chaos: The Personal-Benefit Element in  
United States v. Newman 
In December 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 
United States v. Newman articulated a unique formulation of the personal-
benefit element, as it pertains to “gifts” from tippers to friends.40 Newman 
involved two investment portfolio managers, Todd Newman and Anthony 
Chiasson, who were both charged under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for 
trading on confidential information regarding two companies: Dell and 
NVIDIA.41 Newman and Chiasson were “remote tippees,” as they both ob-
tained the information via two distinct tipping chains several tips removed 
from the original disclosure, which originated from insiders within each com-
pany.42 For example, the Dell tipping chain originated with Tipper A, an in-
                                                                                                                           
 36 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664; see also id. (“The theory . . . is that the insider, by giving the infor-
mation out selectively, is in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal in-
formation, or other things of value for himself . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Victor 
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 348 (1979)). 
 37 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
 38 Id. Under that framework, the Court held that there was no actionable violation by Dirks be-
cause there was no fiduciary breach to the shareholders by those insiders who tipped Dirks the confi-
dential information. See id. at 665–67. The Court concluded that the purpose of the tipper’s disclo-
sure was to expose the fraud rather than to reap any pecuniary gain or to make a gift of information to 
the initial tippee. See id. at 667. 
 39 See, e.g., Jiau, 734 F.3d at 153 (applying the Dirks formulation); Obus, 693 F.3d at 285 
(same); United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same); Stendahl, 
supra, note 5. 
 40 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (“[W]e hold that such an inference is impermissible in the 
absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is 
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valua-
ble nature.”); Dauenhauer, supra note 7, at 56–57 (discussing one critical view of the holding in 
Newman as erroneously redefining the personal-benefit element, and the difficulties that definition 
poses for prosecutors). 
 41 Newman, 773 F.3d at 442–43. 
 42 See id. at 443. 
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sider analyst with Dell’s investor relations department.43 Tipper A tipped in-
formation regarding Dell’s unannounced earning numbers to Tippee A, an 
analyst at another firm, who then indirectly relayed the information to New-
man and Chiasson through two and three additional levels of tips.44 Tipper A 
and Tippee A attended business school together, but aside from some career 
advice and résumé assistance that Tippee A had provided to Tipper A prior to 
the original tip, evidence suggested that the two were not “close.”45 The 
NVIDIA tipping chain had a similar structure, where the original tipper and 
tippee knew each other from church.46 
In reversing the defendants’ convictions, the Second Circuit found that 
there was insufficient evidence to establish that either tipper had received a 
personal benefit in exchange for their tips.47 The court held that although the 
personal-benefit element is “permissive” under the Dirks framework, “the 
mere fact of friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature” is an insuffi-
cient basis to infer that a personal benefit was received for the tip.48 The court 
acknowledged that Dirks suggested that such an inference can be made from 
evidence of a friendship or familial relationship, but ultimately determined 
that an inference of personal benefit to the insider is impermissible in the ab-
sence of other factors.49 Additional proof of a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship, that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and 
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See id. Rob Ray, of Dell’s investor relations department was the original insider tipper in 
the Dell tipping chain. See id. He will be referred to as “Tipper A” throughout this Comment for 
the sake of clarity. 
 44 See id. (noting that Newman and Chiasson were four and five levels removed from the 
original tipper, respectively). Sandy Goyal, an analyst at Neuberger Berman, was the original 
tippee. See id. He will be referred to as “Tippee A” throughout this Comment for the sake of clari-
ty. 
 45 See id. at 452. 
 46 See id. at 443. The NVIDIA tipping chain originated with Chris Choi (“Tipper B”), a mem-
ber of NVIDIA’s finance unit, who tipped similar information regarding the company to Hyung Lim 
(“Tippee B”), a former executive of a technology company whom Tipper B knew from church. See 
id. at 443, 452. The information eventually circulated from Tippee B to Newman and Chiasson in 
similar fashion, several levels removed through a distinct tipping chain of analyst friends. See id. at 
443. 
 47 See id. at 442, 451–53 (concluding that evidence was too thin to support an inference that 
the insider received any personal benefit in exchange for his tip and thus holding that the govern-
ment failed to establish the first prong of the personal benefit test announced in Dirks). The court 
further held that the government failed to establish that “Newman and Chiasson knew that they were 
trading on information obtained from insiders, or that those insiders received any benefit in exchange 
for such disclosures.” See id. at 453. 
 48 Id. at 452. The court further noted that although case law has emphasized the gain received 
by the insider need not be “immediately pecuniary,” it is still critical that any benefit received is 
one “of some consequence” to establish a fraudulent breach. See id. 
 49 Id. These other factors must establish evidence of “a relationship between the insider and 
the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the [recipient], or an intention to benefit the [recip-
ient].” Id. (quoting Jiau, 734 F.3d at 153). 
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was required by the court before it could infer personal benefit and find a 
breach by the insider.50 Newman’s holding was received with some contro-
versy, as many have interpreted the court’s articulation of the personal-benefit 
element as more constrictive than the standard announced in Dirks.51 
C. United States v. Salman in the District Court 
In 2002, Bassam Salman’s future brother-in-law, Maher Kara joined 
Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group.52 Over the next few years 
Maher began seeking help understanding scientific concepts relevant to the 
healthcare and biotechnology industries from his brother Mounir (“Michael”) 
Kara, who held an undergraduate degree in chemistry.53 In 2004, the Kara 
brothers’ discussions began to focus on companies that were active in the are-
as of oncology and pain management, and Maher eventually began to suspect 
that Michael was trading on the information they discussed, although Michael 
denied it.54 As time went on, Michael became more persistent about eliciting 
confidential information from Maher, and Maher knowingly obliged.55 From 
late 2004 through early 2007, Maher regularly provided Michael with materi-
al nonpublic information relating to a number of companies for which 
Citigroup was providing important advice in the context of potential acquisi-
tions, and Michael traded on that information.56 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See id. The court further concluded that the absence of any additional proof in the underly-
ing prosecution precluded the government from establishing that the insiders breached any duty 
through their disclosures. See id. at 453. 
 51 See Dauenhauer, supra note 7, at 56–57; Peter J. Henning, Court Strikes on Insider Trad-
ing, and Congress Lobs Back, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/
17/business/dealbook/court-strikes-on-insider-trading-and-congress-lobs-back.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/EV34-QFPL]; see also Patricia Hurtado, Hedge Fund Insider Verdicts Tossed in Blow to 
U.S. Probe, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-12-10/hedge-fund-insider-verdicts-tossed-in-blow-to-us-investigation [https://perma.cc/47E7-
BPWJ] (discussing the practical consequences of a higher evidentiary bar for inferences of per-
sonal benefit under the tipper-tippee theory of insider-trading liability, which may lead to more 
rampant insider trading and fewer prosecutions). On October 5, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied U.S. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli’s petition for a writ of certiorari for Newman with-
out comment. Newman, 136 S. Ct. at 242; see Ed Beeson, Supreme Court Rejects Newman Insider 
Trading Appeal, LAW360 (Oct. 5, 2015, 9:40 AM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/708238/
supreme-court-rejects-newman-insider-trading-appeal [https://perma.cc/4MFF-NCMH]. 
 52 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1088; Indictment ¶ 2, United States v. Salman (Salman I), No. 
CR-11-0625 EMC, 2013 WL 6655176, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Indictment], 
aff’d, 792 F.3d 1087, cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899. 
 53 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1089; Indictment, supra note 52, ¶¶ 4, 16(b). 
 54 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1089; Indictment, supra note 52, ¶¶ 4, 11, 16. 
 55 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1089. 
 56 Id.; Salman I, 2013 WL 6655176, at *1; Indictment, supra note 52, ¶¶ 11, 12, 16 (a)–(c). 
Meanwhile, in 2003, Salman’s sister and Maher Kara got engaged, and the Salman and Kara fami-
lies grew increasingly close over the next few months. See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1089; Indict-
ment, supra note 52, ¶ 6. Salman and Michael became fast friends. Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1089. 
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In the fall of 2004, Michael began to share the inside information that he 
had learned from Maher with their brother-in-law, Salman, and encouraged 
Salman to “mirror” his trading activity.57 On September 1, 2011, Salman was 
indicted for several counts of securities fraud under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.58 Evi-
dence presented at trial revealed that on numerous occasions from 2004 to 
2007, Salman’s co-conspirator and Michael executed nearly identical trades 
in securities issued by Citigroup clients shortly before the announcement of 
major transactions.59 At trial, the government presented circumstantial evi-
dence regarding the close familial relationship between Maher (tipper) and 
Michael (tippee), as well as Maher’s intention to help Michael by giving him 
confidential information to establish Maher’s personal benefit and breach of 
fiduciary duties under Dirks.60 Furthermore, the government presented cir-
cumstantial evidence of Salman’s (remote tippee) knowledge of that personal 
benefit to establish the derivative breach required for his own liability.61 On 
September 30, 2013, the jury found Salman guilty on all five counts of securi-
ties fraud, which Salman subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit.62 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1089; Indictment, supra note 52, ¶¶ 11–13, 16(d)–(f). Instead of 
trading through his own account, Salman would deposit money, through a number of transfers, 
into a brokerage account held jointly by his wife’s sister and her husband, Karim Bayyouk. See 
Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1089; Indictment, supra note 52, ¶¶ 11–13, 16(d)–(f). Salman would then 
relay the inside information to Karim, and the two would split the profits. See Salman II, 792 F.3d 
at 1089; Indictment, supra note 52, ¶¶ 11–13, 16(d)–(f). On July 6, 2011, Maher Kara pleaded 
guilty to federal criminal charges of securities fraud and conspiracy and was subsequently sen-
tenced to three months of home detention. Kara, SEC Release No. 23341, 2015 WL 5258843, at 
*1 (Sept. 10, 2015). On September 3, 2013, Bayyouk was found guilty of an obstruction charge 
relating to the SEC’s parallel civil action against Maher Kara, Bayyouk, and Salman, and was 
subsequently sentenced to eighteen months in prison. Id. On August 21, 2015, all three consented 
to the entry of final judgment against them in the SEC’s civil action. Id. 
 58 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1088; Salman I, 2013 WL 6655176, at *1; Indictment, supra 
note 52, ¶¶ 15, 17(o), 19. Salman was indicted for one count of conspiracy to commit securities 
fraud and four counts of securities fraud. See Salman I, 2013 WL 6655176, at *1; Indictment, supra 
note 52, ¶¶ 15, 17(o), 19. 
 59 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1089; Salman I, 2013 WL 6655176, at *1; Indictment, supra 
note 52, ¶¶ 11–13, 16(e)–(f), 17(b)–(o); see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing 
that Salman did not execute the trades directly through his own account, but was still liable for the 
fraudulent trading activity). As a result of these trades, Salman and Bayyouk’s account grew from 
$396,000 to approximately $2.1 million. See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1089. 
 60 See Salman I, 2013 WL 6655176, at *6. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1090; Salman I, 2013 WL 6655176, at *1. 
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II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECLINES TO ADOPT AN UNBRIDLED  
READING OF NEWMAN 
This Part discusses the holding by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Salman, in July 2015.63 This Part also 
briefly discusses the controversy surrounding the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit’s articulation of the personal-benefit element in United 
States v. Newman, in December 2014, and further, discusses the relationship 
between these two opinions.64 Section A provides an in-depth discussion of 
the holding in Salman, with particular emphasis on the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion not to adopt a broad reading of the Newman court’s personal-benefit 
definition.65 Section B briefly discusses Newman’s controversial reception, 
and addresses two somewhat contentious views of Salman’s impact on 
Newman’s articulation of personal-benefit.66 
A. The Ninth Circuit Cautions Concerns Over Newman in United States v. 
Salman 
In Salman, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and de-
clined to adopt Salman’s reading of the personal-benefit definition delineated 
by the Second Circuit in Newman.67 The appellant in Salman contended that 
the court in Newman held that evidence of a friendship or familial relation-
ship between tipper and tippee alone was not enough to prove personal bene-
fit, and that there must also be evidence of “at least a potential gain of pecu-
niary or similarly valuable nature” in exchange for the tip.68 The Ninth Cir-
cuit declined to follow Newman to the extent it could be read so broadly, and 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See infra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
 64 See infra notes 75–83 and accompanying text. 
 65 See infra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
 66 See infra notes 75–83 and accompanying text. 
 67 See United States v. Salman (Salman II), 792 F.3d 1087, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, (Salman III) 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016) (mem.); Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 10, at 2–
3. Judge Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting on the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by designation, penned the court’s opinion. Salman II, 
792 F.3d at 1088. Judge Rakoff had previously been asked to consider the effect of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision in United States v. Newman in a SEC civil en-
forcement action on April 5, 2015, in SEC v. Payton in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, but declined to directly confront the issue. See United States v. Newman, 
773 F.3d 438, 445–47 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) (mem.); SEC v. Payton, 
97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 559, 562 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). In Salman, Judge Rakoff was freer to assess 
Newman’s articulation of personal benefit in the criminal context as a visiting judge in the Ninth 
Circuit, where he was unbound from Second Circuit precedent. See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1088; 
Peter J. Henning, Judge Rakoff Ruling on Tips May Help Prosecution on Insider Trading Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/business/dealbook/judge-rakoff-
ruling-on-tips-may-help-prosecution-on-insider-trading-cases.html [https://perma.cc/5BMP-GP5A]. 
 68 See Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 10, at 2–3 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452). 
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found that the evidence of Maher’s intent to benefit his brother through his 
disclosure, along with their close familial relationship, was enough to support 
an inference of personal benefit.69 The Ninth Circuit further stated in dictum 
that such a reading of Newman would have unintended implications, and 
found that the facts of the case were governed directly by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s definition of personal benefit in Dirks v. SEC in 1983.70 
In distinguishing Salman from Newman, the Ninth Circuit noted that in 
Newman there was very thin evidence suggesting that either tipper received 
a personal benefit in exchange for his disclosures.71 The Ninth Circuit em-
phasized the Newman court’s acknowledgment that, under Dirks, personal 
benefit to the insider-tipper can be inferred from making a gift of confiden-
tial information to a trading relative or friend in addition to one that would 
result in a pecuniary gain.72 The Ninth Circuit further emphasized that alt-
hough the Newman court recognized that an inference of a personal benefit 
may be based on a personal relationship between the tipper and tippee, the 
Second Circuit determined that “such an inference is impermissible in the 
absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that gener-
ates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a 
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”73 The Ninth Cir-
cuit observed that the Second Circuit in Newman concluded that evidence 
was insufficient to establish that either tipper had received a personal bene-
                                                                                                                           
 69 Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1093–94. The court noted that, according to his testimony, Maher 
Kara intended to benefit his brother Michael and to fulfill whatever needs Michael had by provid-
ing him with the confidential information. See id. at 1092, 1094. The court further noted that, ac-
cording to Michael’s testimony, he had repeatedly conveyed to Salman that Maher was the source of 
the inside information and asserted that the two of them had to “protect” Maher from exposure. See 
id. at 1092. Moreover, the court concluded that evidence of the brothers’ close relationship and 
Maher’s intent to help his brother was sufficient to establish that Maher Kara had personally bene-
fited from the disclosure. See id. at 1092, 1094. Furthermore, the court concluded that Salman was 
aware of the personal benefit, and therefore Maher’s breach, given his intimate knowledge of the 
brothers’ close relationship. See id. 
 70 See id. at 1092–94 (“The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic infor-
mation also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend.” (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664)). The court noted that if Salman’s reading of Newman 
was accepted, then a corporate insider in the possession of confidential information would be free 
to disclose it to his or her relatives, and they would be free to trade on it, provided that the insider 
asked for no tangible compensation in return. See id. at 1093. 
 71 See id. at 1093–94 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 451–52). The court also distinguished the 
case by noting that in Newman there was also no evidence that either tippee, Newman or Chiasson, 
knew that they were trading on information obtained from insiders. See id.; Newman, 773 F.3d at 
453 (concluding that neither Newman nor Chiasson knew that they were trading on inside infor-
mation). 
 72 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452). 
 73 Id. 
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fit in exchange for their tips, because the “friendships” between the tippers 
and their respective tippees in both instances were only of a casual nature.74 
B. Chicken Little Looks to the Second Circuit: Newman’s  
Reception and Salman’s Response 
The controversy surrounding the Newman decision has focused on the 
Second Circuit’s articulation of the personal-benefit element, which seems to 
require proof of a consequential exchange in the nature of a quid pro quo ra-
ther than a simple gift.75 Many have argued that this formulation represents a 
meaningful departure from Dirks, because it limits the definition of personal 
benefit to a pecuniary exchange, thereby rendering proof of a friendship or 
familial relationship insufficient in and of itself to support the inference of a 
benefit.76 The practical consequence of this view is that it raises the eviden-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See id.; Newman, 773 F.3d at 452–53; see also supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text 
(noting that Tipper A and Tippee A in Newman attended business school together, “but were not 
close,” and that Tipper B and Tippee B knew each other from church). In Salman, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the close familial ties between the brothers, along with Maher’s admission that the disclo-
sure of the confidential information to his brother was intended as a gift, rendered a breach of fiduci-
ary duty that was clear on its face. See 792 F.3d at 1094. 
 75 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 442, 452 (“[T]ippee [must have known] that an insider disclosed 
confidential information and that he did so in exchange for a personal benefit.” (second emphasis 
added)); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14–15, Newman, 773 F.3d 438 [hereinafter Newman 
Petition for Writ of Cert.] (No. 15-137), 2015 WL 4572753, at *14–15; Dauenhauer, supra note 7, 
at 54, 56–57; Peter J. Henning, White Collar Watch, Supreme Court Review Could Redefine Insid-
er Trading, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/business/dealbook/
supreme-court-review-could-redefine-insider-trading.html [https://perma.cc/MYM2-GFLP]; Al-
exandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Solicitor General Asks Supreme Court to Review Insid-
er Trading Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/business/
dealbook/us-asks-supreme-court-to-review-insider-trading-ruling.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7FSE-
JX9R]; Jonathan E. Richman et al., Ninth Circuit Disagrees with Second Circuit on Personal-
Benefit Requirement for Insider Trading, Client Alert, NAT’L L. REV. (July 10, 2015), http://www.
natlawreview.com/article/ninth-circuit-disagrees-second-circuit-personal-benefit-requirement-
insider-trading [https://perma.cc/9JQP-9LPD]; cf. SEC v. Holley, No. 11-0205 (DEA), 2015 WL 
5554788, at *5–6 (D. N.J. Sep. 21, 2015) (noting that Newman held that a personal benefit may be 
found when a tipper intends to benefit those with whom he shares a close personal relationship 
through his confidential disclosure, even in the absence of a pecuniary gain). In U.S. v. Salman, 
Judge Rakoff Distinguishes Newman in 9th Circuit Opinion Affirming Insider Trading Conviction, 
SEC. DIARY (July 6, 2015), http://securitiesdiary.com/tag/judge-jed-rakoff/ [https://perma.cc/
A67G-MV26] [hereinafter Judge Rakoff Distinguishes Newman] (arguing that Newman was not a 
meaningful departure from existing insider trading law). The U.S. Supreme Court in SEC v. Dirks 
in 1983 held that a personal benefit may be inferred from a relationship that suggests such an ex-
change, but alternatively emphasized that a personal benefit may also “exist when an insider makes a 
gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” See 463 U.S. at 664. 
 76 See Dauenhauer, supra note 7, at 56–57, 91–92; Henning, supra note 51; Stevenson & 
Goldstein, supra note 75. But see Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *5 (concluding that the defendant 
failed to establish that Newman represented a “significant change in the law” for purposes of seek-
ing relief from final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) because intent to 
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tiary bar for prosecutors, thereby making tipper-tippee insider trading cases 
harder to prove and less likely to be pursued.77 
Many initially viewed the Salman decision as creating a circuit split re-
garding the scope of personal benefit because of the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to 
adopt Salman’s reading of Newman and its reaffirmation of the standard an-
nounced in Dirks.78 Dirks clearly identifies two different situations in which a 
court may infer from objective facts and circumstances that the insider re-
ceived a personal benefit: (1) a relationship that suggests a quid pro quo ex-
change; or (2) a “gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend.”79 Those who endorse the view that the Second and Ninth Circuits are 
split argue that Salman recognized the difference between the two categories 
of personal benefit announced in Dirks and applied the one most applicable to 
the facts, whereas Newman consolidated the two categories into one stand-
ard.80 
In contrast, others have maintained that Salman stands for the proposi-
tion that Newman does not represent a meaningful departure from the Dirks 
framework and will be narrowly construed going forward.81 They argue that 
                                                                                                                           
benefit someone with whom an insider shares a “close personal relationship” is still sufficient to 
show personal benefit under Newman); Judge Rakoff Distinguishes Newman, supra note 75. 
 77 E.g., Hurtado, supra note 51; see also Ed Beeson, Bharara Drops Steinberg Insider Trading 
Cases After Newman, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 2015, 3:44 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/717819/
bharara-drops-steinberg-insider-trading-case-after-newman?article_related_content=1 [https://perma.
cc/9AJS-HYRK] (discussing the decision of U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, 
Preet Bharara, to drop charges in several insider trading cases following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
refusal to review the Newman decision, because of his view that “maintaining the guilty pleas” in 
light of Newman “would not be in the interest of justice”). 
 78 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11–14, Salman III, 136 S. Ct. 899 (No. 15-628), 
2015 WL 7180648, 11–14 [hereinafter Salman Petition for Writ of Cert.]; Newman Petition for 
Writ of Cert., supra note 75, at 22–24; Baker et al., supra note 13; Stevenson & Goldstein, supra 
note 75; Richman et al., supra note 75. 
 79 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64; Newman Petition for Writ of Cert., supra note 75, at 17. 
The Court further noted that “intention to benefit a particular recipient” refers to a situation where 
the tipper hopes for a return from a “particular” tippee who is in a position to do the tipper a per-
sonal business favor. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
 80 See Newman Petition for Writ of Cert., supra note 75, at 17–19, 23–24. The Ninth Circuit 
focused on whether there was sufficient evidence that the tipper disclosed the confidential infor-
mation with the intent to benefit a trading relative, and stayed within the Dirks framework. See Sal-
man II, 792 F.3d at 1092–94; Newman Petition for Writ of Cert., supra note 75, at 23–24. In con-
trast, the Second Circuit emphasized the lack of evidence that there was a “meaningfully close per-
sonal relationship” between the tipper and tippee, or evidence of an “exchange that [was] objective, 
consequential and represent[ed] at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” 
See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452–53 (emphasis added); Newman Petition for Writ of Cert., supra 
note 75, at 18, 20, 23–25. 
 81 See, e.g., Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *4–5 (discussing Newman as clarifying the stand-
ard announced in Dirks); SEC v. Megalli, No. 1:13–cv–3783–AT, 2015 WL 9703789, at *7 (N.D. 
Ga. Sept. 24, 2015) (“Newman has made waves, but [we are] not convinced it is a total sea 
change.”); Vincent Paul (Trace) Schmeltz III, Commentary, Newman Appeal Represents Govern-
ment’s Misguided Effort to Change the Law of Insider Trading, WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES, Sept. 
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the Salman court interpreted the Newman holding as being limited to instanc-
es where the relationship between tipper and tippee is casual, rather than flat-
out rejecting the Second Circuit’s reasoning.82 Furthermore, observers con-
tend that Newman merely limited how far the government can stretch casual 
friendships and acquaintances to prove liability under the Dirks framework.83 
III. THE SKY IS NOT FALLING: SALMAN READS NEWMAN BROADLY 
This Part argues that in 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. Salman correctly declined to apply the personal-
benefit definition described by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in its 2015 decision, United States v. Newman.84 First, this Part argues 
that Salman is not inconsistent with Newman because Newman involved at-
tenuated “friendships” whereas Salman involved family: two categories that 
can, and should, be treated differently.85 Second, this Part argues that the 
Ninth Circuit’s measured interpretation of Newman in Salman illustrates that 
Newman was not a meaningful departure from existing insider-trading doc-
trine, but rather an attempt to set limits to the type of “friendships” from 
which personal benefit may be inferred under the framework established by 
the United States Supreme Court in its 1983 decision, Dirks v. SEC.86 Finally, 
this Part argues that the two cases should be reconciled by the Supreme Court 
in an affirmation of the Salman holding and a clearer articulation of existing 
doctrine.87 
First, Salman and Newman are reconcilable because they involve signif-
icantly different facts pertaining to the insider-tippee relationships.88 In New-
                                                                                                                           
24, 2015, at *1, *5; Judge Rakoff Distinguishes Newman, supra note 75 (“In short, the sky did not 
start falling when the Newman opinion was adopted.”); Levine, Justices Will Know, supra note 7. 
 82 See Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *5; Henning, supra note 67; Judge Rakoff Distinguishes 
Newman, supra note 75 (arguing that Newman never suggested that evidence of a tipper making a 
personal gift of confidential information to a tippee with whom he has a close relationship is insuf-
ficient to support a conviction); see also Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1093–94 (“[A]lthough the ‘per-
sonal benefit’ standard is ‘permissive,’ it ‘does not suggest that the Government may prove the 
receipt of a personal benefit by the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social 
nature.’” (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452)). 
 83 See Judge Rakoff Distinguishes Newman, supra note 75 (arguing that Newman creates 
limits on the types of friendships that infer a disclosure was intended as the “gift of confidential 
information” described in Dirks); Levine, Justices Will Know, supra note 7. 
 84 See infra notes 88–102 and accompanying text. 
 85 See infra notes 88–96 and accompanying text. 
 86 See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
 87 See infra notes 103–108 and accompanying text. 
 88 See United States v. Salman (Salman II), 792 F.3d 1087, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, (Salman III) 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016) (mem.); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 
452–53 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) (mem.); SEC v. Andrade, C.A. No. 15-
231 S, 2016 WL 199423, at *3–4 (D. R.I. Jan. 15, 2016); SEC v. Holley, No. 11-0205 (DEA), 
2015 WL 5554788, at *1, *5 (D. N.J. Sept. 21, 2015); Jonathan E. Richman, What to Expect from 
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man, the “friendships” between the two insiders and their respective tippees 
were of a casual and attenuated nature: alumni of the same school and fellow 
parishioners.89 Because Dirks refers to a “gift of confidential information to a 
trading . . . friend,” the Second Circuit in Newman was forced to read in-
between the lines of Dirks and to answer the necessary question of what con-
stitutes a “friend.”90 It noted that if the personal-benefit requirement could be 
met by the mere fact of two people knowing each other in a social or casual 
capacity, “the personal benefit requirement would be a nullity.”91 
                                                                                                                           
High Court’s New Insider Trading Case, LAW360 (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.law360.com/
articles/748341/what-to-expect-from-high-court-s-new-insider-trading-case [https://perma.cc/KS5C-
ES9Y]; Judge Rakoff Distinguishes Newman, supra note 75; Levine, Justices Will Know, supra 
note 7; see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (“[T]he elements of fiduciary duty and 
exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential in-
formation to a trading relative or friend.” (emphasis added)). 
 89 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452–53; Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *5. For example, Tipper A 
knew Tippee A from business school, but the court found evidence that the two were not very close 
and that their relationship was of little consequence. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. Testimony showed 
that Tippee A occasionally provided Tipper A with career advice. See id. The court concluded that 
the evidence on record and the nature of the advice amounted to “little more than the encourage-
ment one would generally expect of a fellow alumnus or casual acquaintance.” See id. at 453. 
Tipper B knew Tippee B from church and the two occasionally socialized together, but there was 
no history of personal favors or a relationship that was objectively meaningful. See id. Tipper B 
even testified that he did not even know Tippee B was trading in NVIDIA stock. See id. Such 
“casual friendships” could either represent a potential gap in the Dirks framework or mark its limits. 
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664; Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *4–5; United States v. Whitman, 904 
F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Mitchell A. Agee, Friends in Low Places: 
How the Law Should Treat Friends in Insider Trading Cases, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 345, 365–
66 (2013) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely addressed how friends should be 
treated in insider trading cases). Although the meaning of “trading relative” is fairly clear and 
objective, “trading friend” is more ambiguous and subjective. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664; Agee, 
supra, at 372–73; Levine, When Can Investors Talk, supra note 13 (positing the question of 
whether frequent, cordial interaction with a company’s investor-relations agent constitutes a 
friendship under the Dirks framework). 
 90 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452–53; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (“Determining whether 
an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be 
easy for courts.”); supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguous connotation of 
“friend” as used in Dirks). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2014 in United 
States v. Newman implied that in prior cases where sufficient evidence was found that a personal 
benefit was reasonably inferred from casual friendships and acquaintances, there were additional 
factors present that perhaps superseded the casual nature of the friendship. See 773 F.3d at 452–
53. In the cases cited by the court, there was evidence of relationships that had the strong potential 
to yield a pecuniary gain in the near future. See id.; see also United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 
153 (2d Cir. 2013) (involving an insider who received access to an investment club where stock 
tips and insight were routinely discussed); SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that evidence of personal benefit was sufficient where tipper and tippee worked close-
ly together on real estate deals and commonly split commissions); SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 
77 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding evidence of personal benefit to be sufficient when tipper passed infor-
mation to a friend who referred others to the tipper’s dental practice). 
 91 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. This reading makes sense when considering the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s reasoning behind the inclusion of “gift . . . to a trading relative or friend” in the 
personal benefit standard first announced in Dirks. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664; Andrade, 2016 WL 
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In contrast, in Salman there were close familial ties between the broth-
ers. 92 The court explicitly noted that under such facts involving a familial 
relationship, Dirks squarely governs.93 Several lower courts have since agreed 
with that distinction.94 The close familial relationship and Maher’s admission 
that the disclosure of the confidential information to Michael was intended to 
help him demonstrated a clear breach of duty under the Dirks framework 
predicated by the personal benefit of tipping a trading family member.95 In 
recognizing these important distinctions, the Ninth Circuit correctly declined 
to go any further than the facts, and Dirks, required.96 
Secondly, the Second Circuit’s formulation of a more descriptive stand-
ard for personal benefit in Newman was not a meaningful departure from the 
Dirks framework, but rather a recognition of its limits and an attempted clari-
                                                                                                                           
199423, at *4. The Court explained that “the tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself 
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. This arguably implies the 
requirement of an intent to financially assist someone with whom the tipper has a personal rela-
tionship. See id.; Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1092, 1094 (emphasizing evidence of the insiders intent to 
“fulfill” his brother’s needs). It is hard to imagine a person altruistic to the point of “gifting” mil-
lions of dollars to someone they attended business school with, or met through church, considering 
the risk of prosecution. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452–53; Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *5. On 
Wall Street, for example, there is a “culture of reciprocity,” so traders may reasonably expect a tip 
in the future, from a friend or acquaintance that they know to be actively trading in exchange for a 
tip from them. See James B. Stewart, Justices Take on a Muddled Issue: Insider Trading, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/29/business/justices-take-on-a-muddled-
issue-insider-trading.html [https://perma.cc/3HBC-XR4C]. This is markedly different from gifting 
a tip to a relative out of love, or an offhand remark made to an attenuated acquaintance. See id.; 
see also Andrade, 2016 WL 199423, at *4 (acknowledging the difference between tipping a friend 
of a social nature and tipping a family member or close friend, suggesting that the former may 
involve too high of a risk if no pecuniary reciprocity is involved). 
 92 Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1092, 1094; Indictment, supra note 54, ¶¶ 4, 6; see also supra note 
69 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the insider-tippee relationships). 
 93 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1092. 
 94 See Andrade, 2016 WL 199423, at *3–4; Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *5. For example, in 
2015, in SEC v. Holley, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey agreed with the U.S 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Salman that “if Newman can be read to 
require the receipt of some tangible benefit for insider trading liability,” then the implications 
would be absurd. See Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *5. 
 95 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1092, 1094; Stewart, supra note 87 (citing cases involving con-
fidential tips between relatives as classic, straightforward examples of insider trading). The Ninth 
Circuit noted that the Maher’s tip to Michael “was precisely the ‘gift of confidential information 
to a trading relative’ that Dirks envisioned.” Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. 
at 664). The court gave great weight to the fact that Maher testified that by providing his brother 
confidential information, he intended to “benefit his brother and to fulfill whatever needs he had.” 
Id. 
 96 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1092–94; Brief for the U.S. in Opposition at 13, United States v. 
Salman (Salman III), 136 S. Ct. 899 (Dec. 14, 2014) (No. 15-628); Judge Rakoff Distinguishes 
Newman, supra note 75. An insider making a “gift of confidential information to a trading rela-
tive” is a situation explicitly mentioned in Dirks. 463 U.S. at 664. 
2016] The Ninth Circuit’s Reading of Newman’s “New” Definition of Personal Benefit 157 
fication.97 The court’s effort to flesh out the meaning of what the Dirks court 
referred to as “a gift . . . to a trading relative or friend” reflects this notion.98 
The Ninth Circuit’s reading of Newman in Salman further supports this 
view.99 Salman explicitly noted that the Newman court recognized the per-
missive nature of the personal-benefit requirement, as Dirks instructed, and 
further offered clarifying language to elucidate its rationale.100 The Newman 
court clarified its “new definition” by noting that it requires a showing of ei-
ther a relationship that suggests an exchange, or an intention from the insider 
to benefit the recipient.101 Because Newman provides two alternatives for the 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452–53; Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *4–5 (discussing Newman 
as clarifying the standard announced in Dirks); Schmeltz, supra note 81, at *5 (arguing that the 
Newman decision clarifies and fortifies the test for determining personal benefit); Judge Rakoff 
Distinguishes Newman, supra note 75 (emphasizing the distinguishability between Salman and 
Newman); Richman, supra note 88 (discussing this argument as one possible conclusion that the 
U.S. Supreme Court could reach when it hears the Salman appeal); cf. Levine, Justices Will Know, 
supra note 7 (arguing that Newman was an effort to draw lines between cheating and research, and 
conveying confidential information to family members seems to be more clearly in the realm of 
cheating); see also supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (arguing that in emphasizing the 
ambiguous and casual nature of the tipper-tippee relationships and in noting that “the Government 
may [not] prove the receipt of a personal benefit by the mere fact of friendship,” Newman implic-
itly recognized that there must be a limiting principal pertaining to “friend” under Dirks). The 
court in Salman did not “reject” what Newman actually held. See Judge Rakoff Distinguishes New-
man, supra note 75 (arguing that Newman did not hold that an exchange in the nature of a quid pro 
quo was an absolute necessity to establish the personal-benefit element in all cases, but rather 
Newman implied that a quid pro quo was required in cases involving attenuated relationships). 
 98 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452–53 (quoting Jiau, 734 F.3d at 153); see also Salman II, 792 
F.3d at 1093–94 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664). The court in Salman rightfully emphasized that 
this search simply rendered insufficient evidence. See 792 F.3d at 1093–94 (“Applying these 
standards, the court [in Newman] concluded that the ‘circumstantial evidence . . . was simply too 
thin to warrant the inference that the corporate insiders received any personal benefit in exchange 
for their tips . . . .” (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 451–52)). 
 99 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1092–94. 
 100 Id. at 1093–94 (“Newman itself recognized that the “personal benefit is broadly defined to 
include not only pecuniary gain, but also . . . the benefit one would obtain from simply making a 
gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 
452)); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64 (discussing objective criteria that may allow an infer-
ence of either a direct or indirect benefit); Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (“In other words . . . this 
requires evidence of ‘a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro 
quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the [latter].’” (alterations in the original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Jiau, 734 F.3d at 153)). The court in Salman could have even followed Newman 
and reached the same result by relying on that clarifying language, because the court found suffi-
cient evidence that Maher Kara intended to benefit his brother. See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1092; 
Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *4; Schmeltz, supra note 81, at *5; see also Newman, 773 F.3d at 
452 (“[O]r an intention to benefit the [latter].”). 
 101 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452; Stewart, supra note 91 (acknowledging the difference be-
tween a tip with an expectation of reciprocity and a tip to a relative out of love). Consistent with 
that language, some of the lower courts that have heard defenses raised on Newman grounds have 
construed the opinion as holding that there must be sufficient evidence of either a pecuniary ex-
change or a meaningfully close personal relationship between tipper and tippee. See, e.g., Holley, 
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basis of an inference of personal benefit, the “new” definition may not be as 
narrowing as many initially thought.102 
Finally, the U.S. Supreme should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Salman when it reviews the decision in October 2016 and emphasize the dif-
ference between casual relationships and close friendships or familial rela-
tionships for the purposes of determining personal benefit.103 Salman did not 
create a true circuit split because the Ninth Circuit only declined to follow 
Newman to the extent that it went as far as Salman had argued.104 The Ninth 
Circuit interpreted Salman’s argument as suggesting that the Newman person-
al-benefit standard requires proof of a tangible exchange in all instances, even 
in those involving a familial relationship.105 The court was correct in declin-
ing to adopt this reading and noted the absurd implications of extending 
Newman beyond the realm of casual relationships.106 The U.S. Supreme 
Court should recognize those implications, and affirm the Ninth Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                           
2015 WL 554788, at *4; SEC v. Jafar, No. 13-4645 (JPO), 2015 WL 3604228, at *1, *4–5 
(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2015). 
 102 See Andrade, 2016 WL 199423, at *3–4 (acknowledging the distinction between casual 
relationships and familial relationships and close friendships, and noting the logic behind requir-
ing some additional evidence in cases involving casual or social relationships); Holley, 2015 WL 
554788, at *4. 
 103 See Andrade, 2016 WL 199423, at *3–4; Stewart, supra note 91; Levine, Justices Will 
Know, supra note 7 (discussing the intuitive distinction between social, business acquaintances 
discussing market information and a CEO and his or her family member doing the same); Rich-
man, supra note 88 (noting the possibility that the Court could conclude that different inferences 
should be drawn from relationships of a substantially different character). The question before the 
U.S. Supreme Court is likely to be determinative to Salman’s conviction, because the government 
showed no proof that Michael conferred an objective, pecuniary benefit upon his brother of any 
manner in exchange for the tips. See Salman Petition for Writ of Cert., supra note 78, at 14–15. 
 104 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1093–94 (“To the extent Newman can be read to go so far, we 
decline to follow it.”); Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 10, at 3 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 
452); Schmeltz, supra note 81, at *5; Judge Rakoff Distinguishes Newman, supra note 75; supra 
notes 96–98 and accompanying text (arguing that the holding in Newman has been misconstrued 
as requiring a pecuniary exchange in all instances to prove the personal-benefit element). Sal-
man’s brief emphasizes a portion of the Newman decision that suggests evidence of some type of 
“exchange” is also necessary in all instances where there is evidence of a personal relationship. 
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 10, at 3. 
 105 See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1093–94. 
 106 See id. at 1094; Andrade, 2016 WL 199423, at *3–4; Holley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *5; 
Schmeltz, supra note 81, at *4–5; Judge Rakoff Distinguishes Newman, supra note 75 (arguing 
that Newman never held that an exchange in the nature of a quid pro quo was a prerequisite to 
establish personal-benefit element). By declining to extend Newman beyond its facts, Salman should 
assure critics that application of the Newman holding will be limited by the courts to situations in 
which the insider-tippee relationship is of a casual nature. See Salman II, 792 F.3d at 1093–94; Hol-
ley, 2015 WL 5554788, at *4–5; Judge Rakoff Distinguishes Newman, supra note 75. Moreover, it 
is of particular importance due to the opinion’s author—Judge Rakoff, U.S. District Court Judge for 
the Southern District of New York—who has a well-respected perspective on white-collar crime, and 
insider-trading law specifically. See Baker, supra note 13. 
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holding in Salman.107 It should also clarify the Dirks doctrine to allow a 
stronger presumption of personal benefit when insiders provide confidential 
information to trading family members or close friends, as in Salman, rather 
than casual “friends” or acquaintances, as in Newman.108 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit correctly declined to extend the Newman personal-
benefit definition beyond its facts, and the U.S. Supreme Court should affirm 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Salman upon review in October 2016. Salman’s 
reading of Newman illustrates the crucial distinction between close relation-
ships and attenuated “friendships” for the purposes of determining personal 
benefit. Together, Salman and Newman hint at the appropriate limits to the 
government’s power to stretch casual friendships into a gift of confidential 
information. The delineation should largely depend on the nature of the un-
derlying relationship between the tipper and tippee, with particular emphasis 
on the distinction between family and friends. Salman presents the U.S. Su-
preme Court with the opportunity to revisit and clarify its decision in Dirks 
and announce to the world that the sky did not start falling when Second Cir-
cuit decided Newman, but rather became a little less cloudy. 
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 107 See Andrade, 2016 WL 199423, at *3–4; Stewart, supra note 91; Levine, Justices Will 
Know, supra note 7. 
 108 See Andrade, 2016 WL 199423, at *3–4; Stewart, supra note 91; Aruna Viswanatha & Brent 
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ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2016, 7:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-takes-up-appeal-that-
tests-limits-on-insider-trading-prosecutions-1453219625 (quoting a former federal prosecutor as 
noting the absurdity of the Supreme Court potentially sanctioning the “tipping of brothers-in-law”); 
Levine, Justices Will Know, supra note 7; Richman, supra note 88 (noting the possibility that the 
U.S. Supreme Court could conclude that different inferences should be drawn from relationships of a 
substantially different character). 
